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sued Marock for negligence. Marock sought a declaratory judgment
maintaining St. Paul had a duty both to defend and to indemnify
Marock in the suit. Marock and St. Paul both moved for summary
judgment.
As the determinative issue in this case, the court looked to whether
Trinity's injuries resulted from an accident. The court agreed with
Trinity and found foreseeability, not intent, as the threshold at bar.
The court maintained Marock intentionally diverted the creek while
simultaneously lacking specific intent to cause injury. However, the
court did not deem the natural and predictable consequences of such
acts accidental. Thus, Trinity's injuries were not the result of an
accident.
Furthermore, Trinity argued a decrease in available downstream
water was a natural and foreseeable result of diverting the creek. The
court agreed and found the very presence of a water permit system
reflects the finite nature of water resources, such as this creek.
Therefore, although Marock may have lacked knowledge as to the
identity of the downstream users, a decrease in downstream water was
a natural and foreseeable result of diverting the creek, which harmed
downstream users.
In order to indemnify St. Paul, Marock argued Trinity's negligence
allegations proved the accidental nature of the harm. The court
disagreed, finding that the diversion was intentional, but not
negligent. Therefore, St. Paul did not have a duty to defend or
indemnify Marock. Finally, Marock argued it did not intend to inflict
harm on Trinity, however, the court reiterated it found foreseeability,
not intent, as the issue in this case.
Willow Arnold

STATE COURTS
ALABAMA
City of Dothan v. Eighty-Four West, Inc., No. 2991351, 20001 Ala. Civ.
App. LEXIS 313 (Ala. Civ. App. June 15, 2001) (holding the "common
enemy rule" entitles a property owner to construct a dam on his
property to fend off oncoming surface water).
The City of Dothan ("Dothan") appealed a trial court order that
found a landowner, Flowers, was authorized to construct a dam on his
property pursuant to the "common-enemy" rule. Flowers owned
property over which an easement ran to allow drainage of surface
water from his property through adjacent property. In 1997, Flowers
applied for a permit from Dothan to build an earthen dam on his
property to prevent surface water from an upper property not owned
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by him from flowing onto his property. Dothan alleged it conditioned
granting the permit to Flowers on his designing a system that adhered
to local ordinance. Dothan claimed Flowers refused to design such a
system because the easement on Flowers' land did not limit the
amount of water that flowed through it so the need for the dam did
not exist. Flowers disagreed. Dothan did not grant the permit but
instead filed a complaint for declaratory judgment on the questions of
the amount of water the easement could allow to pass and whether it
had to grant the permit to Flowers that would allow him to build an
earthen dam. Flowers asserted the "common-enemy" rule entitled him
to build a dam to prevent surface water runoff from coming onto, and
damaging his land. The trial court ruled in favor of Flowers. Dothan
appealed and argued the trial court erred in applying the "commonenemy" rule in determining Flowers was entitled to construct a dam.
The "common-enemy" rule is an exception to a civil law rule. The
civil law rule states, as to lands outside a municipality, the lower surface
is doomed by nature to bear servitude to the superior in that it must
receive the water that falls on, and flows from higher land. The
Alabama courts recognize and adhere to the "common-enemy"
exception to the civil law rule, which applies to city lots. The
"common-enemy" rule entitles the owner of urban property to fight off
oncoming surface waters by building walls or dams to prevent water
flowing from the higher property onto his land. A critical requirement
of the rule is a determination of whether the water at issue is surface
water or an intermittent stream. The test for determining into which
category water falls consists of two factors; whether the water is
channeled in well defined banks, and what source provides the water.
Each party to the suit presented witnesses in the trial court who
testified and gave their opinions of into which category the water in
question on Flowers' land fit. Dothan's witnesses concluded it was an
intermittent stream. One expert based his opinion on the fact that the
watercourse lacked vegetation and contained alluvial soils, although he
admitted rainwater provided the only source for the stream. He stated
an intermittent stream did not necessarily have to be fed by
groundwater. Flowers' expert concluded the water was surface water.
He asserted an intermittent stream, by definition, is fed by
groundwater at least some of the time and that this area did not
contain a headwater outcropping.
The court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
considering Flowers' rights under the "common-enemy" rule. Thus,
the court affirmed the trial court's holding that Flowers was entitled to
construct a dam on his property to fend off oncoming surface water
pursuant to the rule.
Rachel Sobrero

